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LAW, 
A. THE STATE HAS EMPLOYED AN INCORRECT ANALYSIS IN 
ASSERTING THAT THE RIGID STANDARD USED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN 
DETERMINING A DISCRETIONARY SENTENCING MATTER WAS 
APPROPRIATE. 
Defendant Brandon Wright ("Wright") has challenged the 
manner in which the trial court applied Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 
(1995), in this case. That Section provides the following: 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was 
found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of offense established 
by statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative 
normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless 
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose 
sentence accordingly. 
* * * 
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this 
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing 
or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two 
degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this 
section by more than two degrees. 
(Emphasis added). 
In this matter, Wright pled guilty to aggravated robbery, a 
1 
first degree felony. In connection with the plea, the state 
twice stipulated on the record to a reduction in sentencing (R. 
6 9 and 96) , so that the offense would be punished as a second 
degree felony. The trial court refused to reduce the sentence on 
the following basis: 
I believe the standard that I'm required to consider in 
determining whether or not to sentence a person, who has 
pled guilty to a first degree to a lesser sentence, that is 
a second degree felony, is there is some basis that is 
required by the interest of justice. And I can't find any 
in this case. The reasons that you suggest, Ms. Kreeck-
Mendez[, counsel for Wright], are rational reasons, but 
that's not the basis in the statute so the motion [to reduce 
the sentence] is denied. 
(R. 96 (emphasis added).) Wright maintains that the trial court 
employed an incorrect standard in connection with ruling on the 
matter. 
1. The State Is Unclear with Regard to the Standard 
Applicable to Trial Courts in Reducing Sentences. 
In its brief, the state asserts that it is "impossible to 
determine exactly what Judge Hanson meant by the [words 
challenged on appeal] and what standard the trial court applied." 
(State's Brief ("S.B.") at 8.) Yet the trial judge's words are 
set forth verbatim in the record and are undisputed with respect 
to the standard the trial court applied in determining reduction 
of Wright's sentence: "the standard that I'm required to 
consider" is whether "there is some basis that is required by the 
interest of justice. " (R. 96.) 
As set forth in Wright's opening brief, Utah case law has 
given meaning to the standard articulated by the trial judge. 
The standard that "requires" a trial judge to act in the 
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"interest of justice" is rigid providing the trial court with the 
least amount of discretion. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 
125, 132 (Utah App. 1997) (trial court is required to engage in 
specific analysis to determine whether the interests of justice 
"will best be served" in ruling on specific evidentiary matter); 
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 n. 3 (Utah 1986) (trial 
court must make in-depth evaluation of proposed evidence and 
consider specific factors in determining whether interests of 
justice will best be served); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 
1989) (legislative enactments will not be stricken "unless the 
interests of justice require the same" under specific and limited 
circumstances -- striking a legislative enactment is not 
discretionary with the trial court); Anderson v. Public Service 
Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822, 827 (Utah 1992) ("as a general 
rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a government entity," 
except in "unusual circumstances 'where it is plain that the 
interests of justice so require'"); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 
1005 (Utah 1982) (court determined phrase "as the interest of 
justice requires" created a rare possibility; standard did not 
provide trial court with broad discretion to act). 
The state does not dispute that Utah appellate courts have 
interpreted the standard identified by the trial court to be 
rigid. (See S.B. in general.) Rather, the state suggests that the 
trial court is not afforded wide discretion in determining 
reduction of sentencing. 
The state asserts that while language in State v. Lipskv. 
3 
608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980), recognizes that discretion is afforded 
the trial court in exercising numerous alternatives available to 
a defendant in sentencing, "Lipskv did not hold that the standard 
to be followed by the trial court in determining whether or not 
to reduce a sentence was a very wide discretion as claimed by the 
defendant." (S.B. at 9-10.) The state's claim is perplexing. 
The Utah Supreme Court's language in Lipskv is clear: 
[The trial] court in fact has very wide discretion in 
sentencing. A court may sentence a defendant to a prison 
term, impose a fine, enter iudcrment for a lower category of 
offense pursuant to § 76-3-402, place him on probation, 
disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to § 
76-3-201, sentence the defendant to serve prison terms 
concurrently or consecutively, order the defendant to pay 
restitution, or suspend a prison sentence. As pointed out 
in the dissent of Justice Wilkins in Reddish v. Smith, 
supra, this wide variety of alternatives not only permits, 
but absolutely requires, the exercise of discretion. 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added); see also State v. 
Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 308 n.l. (Utah 1985); State v. Brooks, 631 
P.2d 878, 879 (Utah 1981) (trial court may reduce sentence in 
accordance with its "statutory prerogative"); State v. Harding, 
576 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1978). 
The state's assertions are in conflict with Utah law. "Wide 
discretion" is afforded the sentencing court in determining 
reduction. Here, the trial court employed a rigid standard. 
2. In Its Attempt to Define the Standard Available to the 
Trial Courts in Sentencing Matters, the State Neglects 
Mandatory Versus Permissive Indicators. 
The state also claims that notwithstanding the limited 
discretion afforded a court under the standard articulated by the 
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trial judge in this matter, and the wide latitude afforded a 
trial court as identified in Lipsky in considering sentencing 
matters, the trial court in this case applied the appropriate 
standard in determining reduction of Wright's sentence. 
To support that claim, the state focuses on the phrase 
"interest of justice" as used by the trial court (R. 96), and 
asserts that phrase is at the heart of Wright's challenge on 
appeal. The state also seeks to define the phrase "unduly harsh" 
as set forth in Section 76-3-402(1). The state misapprehends 
Wright's challenge on appeal, and misconstrues the plain language 
of Section 76-3-402(1). 
With respect to the trial court's use of the phrase "in the 
interest of justice," Wright has acknowledged in his opening 
brief that such interests and the trial court's ability to 
exercise wide discretion can co-exist. 
In other matters, case law and statutory law allow the 
courts to exercise "discretion" to further the "interests of 
justice." See Utah R. Civ. P. 51 (1997) ("[T]he appellate 
court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice may 
review the giving of or failure to give an instruction"); 
Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292 (Utah 1992) (trial court 
in its discretion may allow pleading amendments in the 
interests of justice under Utah R. Civ. P. 15); Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
(Brief of Appellant, dated June 11, 1997, at 7.) 
The focus of Wright's challenge on appeal is not use of the 
phrase "interest of justice." Wright is challenging the court's 
determination that it can only reduce the sentence if the 
interests of justice so mandate. 
Here, the trial court expressed that it was required to 
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exercise the most restrictive amount of discretion in determining 
the matter. The trial court stated it could not act unless the 
interests of justice "required" the action. The term "required" 
is commanding, mandatory, demanding. It is synonymous with 
"must" and "shall," which are interpreted as "mandatory unless 
some compelling reason indicating a contrary intent appears." 
Glenn v. Ferrell, 304 P.2d 380, 382 (Utah 1956); see also Jones 
by and through Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 559 
(Utah App. 1992). 
The statute on the other hand is drafted in terms of "per-
missive" conduct. The court "may . . . enter a judgment . . . for 
the next lower degree of offense." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). 
"The use of the term 'may' gives the trial court discretion 
. . . . According to its ordinary construction the term 'may' 
means permissive . . . ." Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 
820 (Utah App. 1992). The statute empowers the trial court to 
act under the more lenient standard by specifically providing 
that the trial court "may" reduce the sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-402(1). Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, the 
trial court has discretion in reducing sentences. 
With regard to the state's discussion concerning the phrase 
"unduly harsh," Section 76-3-402(1) simply provides that if the 
court "regards" the factors set forth in the statute and 
"concludes" the sentence as imposed is "unduly harsh," the trial 
court "may" reduce the sentence. The unduly harsh language is 
irrelevant with respect to determining the level of discretion 
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available to the trial court in deciding the reduction issue. 
Stated another way, the statute permits the trial court to reduce 
a sentence if it is unduly harsh. Likewise, after having 
"regarded" the factors, the trial court may not reduce the 
sentence. The plain language of the statute is permissive. 
The crux of Wright's appeal is that the trial court did not 
recognize that the plain language of the statute and the decision 
in Lipsky provided the trial court with "wide discretion" in 
determining reduction of Wright's sentence; the trial court 
"believe[d]" the standard was rigid. In describing its authority 
to reduce a sentence, the trial court used language that 
reflected it could only reduce the sentence if mandated or 
required by the interests of justice. 
Since the state has failed to recognize the difference be-
tween the "mandatory" level of discretion and the "permissive" 
level of discretion afforded to the trial court through the sta-
tutory language, its entire Point III is irrelevant. Here, the 
trial court imposed a mandatory level of discretion on itself, 
while the statute provided the permissive level of discretion. 
B. THE STATE IS INCORRECT IN ARGUING THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING ON WRIGHT'S MOTION DID NOT PRESERVE THE ISSUE ON 
APPEAL, AND/OR WRIGHT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE WHERE THE TRIAL 
COURT EMPLOYED THE WRONG STANDARD IN REFUSING TO REDUCE HIS 
SENTENCE. 
The state asserts Wright's motion to the trial court to re-
duce his sentence was insufficient to preserve his argument ari-
sing from the court's ruling on that motion. That assertion is 
incorrect. A motion is sufficient to preserve issues relating 
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thereto, particularly the ruling on the motion. 
The state next relies on the Utah Supreme Court's decisions 
in State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991), and State v. Bvwater, 
748 P.2d 568 (Utah 1987), to assert this Court is precluded from 
considering Wright's issue on appeal. Those cases are not 
persuasive on that point. 
With regard to Elm, 808 P.2d at 1097, the defendant argued 
on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in 
connection with a sentencing matter. Id. at 1098-99. While the 
defendant failed to make a specific objection at the time of 
sentencing concerning the issue, id. at 1100, the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed the sentencing issue on the merits, taking into 
consideration the statute at issue, case law interpreting the 
statute, and the clear record concerning the trial court 
proceedings. Id. at 1098-99. 
Like the defendant in Elm, Wright has asked this Court to 
consider the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-4 02 at 
issue, case law identifying the court's discretion in considering 
sentencing issues, and the clear statements of the trial court as 
set forth in the record. The record compels the determination 
that the trial court exercised an inappropriate level of 
discretion in considering the reduction issue. 
Also, in Elm the defendant argued his due process rights 
were violated during sentencing. The defendant did not raise the 
due process issue in the trial court. Notwithstanding 
"preservation" concerns, the Utah Supreme Court "examined the 
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records of the sentencing hearing and the arguments of both 
parties" to determine the merits of the issue, and found no 
obvious error. Elm, 808 P.2d at 1100. 
This Court is not presented with the same problems faced by 
the Elm court in considering the due process issue. Here, the 
record is clear. "Because this case involves a sentencing error 
rather than a trial error, the error is obvious on the face of 
the record . . . ." State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 
1996). 
The state also relied on Bywater, 748 P.2d at 568. According 
to the Utah Supreme Court in Labrum, Bywater is inapplicable when 
the trial court is directed by statute or judicial decision to 
engage in the specific conduct at issue. Under the plain error 
doctrine, if the statute directs the trial court to enter speci-
fic findings of fact in connection with enhancing a sentence, 
Bywater is not controlling; Labrum is. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940. 
In Bywater, the defendant challenged the constitutionality 
of the minimum-mandatory sentencing scheme of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-403.1 (which the court addressed on the merits), and he 
asserted that the "trial court erred in failing to make specific 
findings of fact and to articulate the standard of proof applied 
in reaching the determination that the sentence of middle 
severity should be imposed." Bywater, 748 P.2d at 568. "At the 
time Bywater was decided, no statute or judicial decision 
required an on-the-record recitation of facts supporting the 
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choice of the middle term of severity. . . Because the trial 
court in Bywater apparently complied (although somewhat 
cursorily) with [the statutory] requirement, failure to make 
specific findings of fact could not have been plain error." 
Labrum, 925 P.2d at 940. 
Bywater is not applicable to this case. The trial judge in 
Wright's case applied the wrong standard as dictated by statute 
and judicial decision. The trial court did not comply with plain 
statutory language. Labrum governs here and supports that this 
Court is not precluded from addressing the merits of Wright's 
issue on appeal. Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939-41. 
Finally, the state claims that the plain error doctrine does 
not apply in this case, since "a defendant must demonstrate three 
points: first that an error exists, second, that the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and third, that the error 
was harmful." (S.B. at 9 (citing State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997)).) 
According to the state, Wright cannot establish the first 
and second points since Lipsky does not support providing the 
trial court with "wide discretion" in determining reduction of 
sentences pursuant to Section 76-3-402(1). Also, the state 
asserts that the trial court's imposition of a mandatory standard 
is consistent with the permissive language of Section 76-3-
402(1). The state is incorrect. As set forth above, it has 
disregarded compelling and binding language in Lipsky, see A.I., 
and misapprehends the difference between language that "requires" 
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action, and that which makes action permissive with use of the 
term "may." See A.2., supra. 
With regard to the "third point," the state asserts that 
assuming the trial court committed plain error by applying the 
wrong standard, "defendant has failed to show that he has been 
harmed by the alleged error." (S.B. at 11.) In support of that 
claim, the state relies on comments made by the trial judge in 
rejecting a request for probation, and claims that such comments 
"led the trial court to deny the motion to reduce the sentence." 
(S.B. at 11.) The state is incorrect. 
In considering the reduction in sentence, the trial judge 
expressed that his hands were tied with respect to the issue 
unless the interests of justice required the reduction. The court 
then stated that Wright's counsel had presented "rational rea-
sons" supporting the reduction. However, because the reasons did 
not meet the rigid standard, he could not reduce the sentence. 
(R. 96.) The trial judge did not suggest that his bases for 
rejecting probation were applicable in determining the reduction 
in sentence. Indeed, the trial judge's statements concerning 
probation were not made in connection with his ruling on the 
request to reduce the sentence. (See R. 96-97 (concerning 
reduction in sentencing), and 98-99 (concerning probation).) 
The state also asserts there is "no reasonable likelihood of 
a different result" if the trial court had employed the correct 
standard. Yet, in this case the court had broader discretion to 
determine the issue than it realized, and it expressed that 
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Wright presented rational reasons for reducing the sentence. In 
addition, the state stipulated twice to the reduction in 
sentencing. Prejudice exists when it is unclear whether the trial 
court would have reached the same result without the error. The 
trial court offered statements suggesting that it may have 
ordered reduction of the sentence by one degree, but could not 
because the stringent standard was not satisfied. Based on the 
record it is not clear how the trial court would have ruled in 
this case if it had applied the more lenient, correct standard. 
The error is prejudicial. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 
(Utah 1993) (in applying the prejudice prong in considering the 
effects of an erroneous instruction, court determined error was 
prejudicial simply because it could not be sure of the basis for 
the jury's determination). 
The issue on appeal in this case simply requires the Court 
to consider the trial court's uncontroverted statement in the 
transcript and apply the law. Based on the trial court's 
statements, it applied the wrong standard to determine whether 
the sentence should be reduced. 
CONCLUSION 
Wright respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further 
proceedings. 
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